FAA Endorsements - Escaping Judicial Review - the Second Circuit Rules That an Endorsement of Panel Recommendations Is Not a Final Order by White, J. Bryan
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 79 | Issue 1 Article 9
2014
FAA Endorsements - Escaping Judicial Review - the
Second Circuit Rules That an Endorsement of
Panel Recommendations Is Not a Final Order
J. Bryan White
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law
and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
J. Bryan White, FAA Endorsements - Escaping Judicial Review - the Second Circuit Rules That an Endorsement of Panel Recommendations Is
Not a Final Order, 79 J. Air L. & Com. 201 (2014)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol79/iss1/9
FAA ENDORSEMENTS-ESCAPING JUDICIAL REVIEW-
THE SECOND CIRCUIT RULES THAT AN
ENDORSEMENT OF PANEL RECOMMENDATIONS IS
NOT A "FINAL ORDER"
J. BRYAN WHITE*
IN PASKAR v. U.S. Department of Transportation, the Second Cir-
cuit decided whether "a general aviation pilot and a not-for-
profit corporation interested in the safety of aviation" could
challenge and request judicial review of a letter written by the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).' The letter endorsed a
series of recommendations made by a panel of experts regard-
ing the impact of a proposed marine trash-transfer facility on
"safe airport operations at LaGuardia Airport."' In order for the
Second Circuit to have jurisdiction to review the FAA Letter
(Letter), (1) the Letter had to constitute a "final order," and (2)
the review had to be requested by "a person disclosing a substan-
tial interest in [the] order."' Had the Second Circuit found
these criteria satisfied, the court could have "affirm [ed],
amend[ed], modif[ied], or set aside any part of the order."4
However, the Second Circuit determined that "because the Let-
ter [was] not a 'final order' for purposes of 49 U.S.C.
§ 46110(a), [the court was] without jurisdiction to review it."5
The petition for review was then dismissed.6
In 2006, as part of its Comprehensive Solid Waste Manage-
ment Plan, the New York City (City) Department of Sanitation
"proposed to reopen four shuttered marine trash-transfer sta-
* J. Bryan White, J.D. Candidate 2015, SMU Dedman School of Law; B.S.B.A.
Finance (Honors), University of Arkansas, 2012.
1 Paskar v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 714 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2013).
2 Id. at 92, 94.
3 Id. at 96.
4 49 U.S.C. § 46110(c) (2006).
5 Paskar, 714 F.3d at 91.
6 Id.
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tions on . . . City waterways."7 North Shore Marine Transfer Sta-
tion, one of the four stations set to be reopened, is located "on
the shore of Flushing Bay, across an inlet from LaGuardia Air-
port."" "Flushing Bay is a natural habitat for waterfowl" that
flock and soar, causing potential "danger to the aircraft that
take off and land at LaGuardia."9 To investigate this and other
concerns, the FAA conducted two aeronautical studies that re-
sulted in findings of "No Hazard," but " [t] he FAA added ... that
while the structure would not be a hazard, its location in La-
Guardia's runway protection zone was strongly discouraged in
the interest of protecting people and property on the ground."' 0
The FAA's finding eventually became final after the Port Au-
thority, which had "objected and petitioned the FAA for discre-
tionary review," withdrew its petitions when the North Shore
Marine Transfer Station was redesigned to bring the height
down to 100 feet and out of the "runway protection zone.""
Four months after the "No Hazard" determinations were
made by the FAA, U.S. Airways Flight 1549 struck a flock of
geese while taking off from LaGuardia Airport." Responding to
the incident, a Queens County Congressman "wrote to [the]
FAA Acting Administrator [to] express [ ] concern that birds
might be . . . gathering about and circling above the proposed
Station."" The Secretary of Transportation, Ray LaHood, subse-
quently appointed a panel of experts from the FAA, the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, the U.S. Air Force, the Port Author-
ity of New York and New Jersey (Port Authority), the City, and
an independent consulting firm to "study the impact of the pro-
posed [Station] on safe airport operations at LaGuardia Air-
port."'" The panel stated in a letter to the Secretary of
Transportation that "changes to the building design, adherence
to strict operational procedures, and the development and im-
plementation of an integrated wildlife hazard management plan
and program [could] reduce the hazards to aviation safety
7 Id. at 92.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 91.
10 Id. at 93 (internal quotation marks omitted).
I IId.
12 Id.; Jonathon D. Rockoff & Elizabeth Holmes, Pilot LandsJet on Hudson, Say-
ing All Aboard, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1232
05240502786899.
13 Paskar, 714 F.3d at 93 (internal quotation marks omitted).
14 Id. at 94.
FAA ENDORSEMENTS
posed by birds attracted to the proposed facility."15 After a re-
view of the panel's report, the FAA concluded that it was "im-
portant for the [C]ity to adopt the recommendations of the
panel."" In a letter sent the day after the panel report was is-
sued, the FAA urged the Department of Sanitation to fully im-
plement the recommendations of the panel." The City obliged
and "proceed[ed] with construction of the facility as recom-
mended by the FAA."
A "general aviation pilot and a not-for-profit corporation in-
terested in the safety of aviation" (Petitioners) filed a petition in
October 2010 asking the court to review the Letter from the
FAA to the City.19 In their complaint, the "Petitioners alleged
that they had a substantial interest in the Letter's subject matter,
that the Letter was a final order reviewable by [the c]ourt, and
that [the Letter] was arbitrary and capricious."2 0 In January
2011, the U.S. Department of Transportation (Respondents)
"moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the Letter was
not an 'order,' and that the court of appeals therefore lack[ed]
subject matter jurisdiction to hear the petition." ' In April 2011,
"a motions panel ... denied the motion to dismiss, holding that
the Letter was an order subject to review pursuant to the provi-
sions of 49 U.S.C. § 46110."22 The Second Circuit determined
that there was "cause to reexamine the motions panel's decision
because 'there [was] reason to believe that [the court's jurisdic-
tion] may [have been] lacking.' "23
The Second Circuit determined that it lacked jurisdiction to
review the Letter and therefore dismissed the petition for re-
view.2 4 The court found that the Letter did not satisfy the two
criteria of a "final order" outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court in
15 Letter from Technical Panel for the Evaluation of the N. Shore Marine
Transfer Station & Its Compatibility with Respect to Bird Strikes & Safe Opera-
tions at LaGuardia Airport, to Ray LaHood, Sec'y of Transp. 2 (Sept. 2, 2010),
available at http://www.faa.gov/airports/airport-safety/wildlife/resources/me-
dia/final_report nsmts-ny.pdf.
16 Id. at A-29.
17 Id.; Paskar, 714 F. 3d at 94-95.




22 Id. (citing Motion Order Denying Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, Paskar v.
U.S. Dep't of Transp., No. 104612-ag (2d Cir. Apr. 6, 2011)).
23 Id. at 96 (quoting Rezzonico v. H & R Block, Inc., 182 F.3d 144, 149 (2d Cir.
1999)).
24 Id. at 99.
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Bennett v. Spear.25 Under that test, the agency action must: (1)
"mark the consummation of the agency's decision making pro-
cess;" and (2) "be one by which rights or obligations have been
determined, or from which legal consequences will flow."2' The
Second Circuit found that the Letter did not meet these criteria,
specifically stating that "[n]o term in the Letter 'imposes an ob-
ligation' on the City, 'denies a right' of the City, or 'fixes some
legal relationship' with the City."2 7 Furthermore, the court
noted that there was "nothing in the Letter that command [ed]
the City to stop, change, or continue construction of the North
Shore Station" and that "[t]he City could have accepted or re-
jected the FAA's recommendations without recourse by any
party."2 The court continued, stating,
"A person disclosing a substantial interest in an order" issued by
the Administrator of the FAA "may apply for review of the order
by filing a petition for review . . . in the court of appeals of the
United States for the circuit in which the person resides or has its
principal place of business. "29
The Second Circuit assumed, without deciding, that the peti-
tioners had a "substantial interest" in the matter before the
court.30 Therefore, the determinative issue was whether the Let-
ter constituted an "order" by the FAA.
"Order" is defined in the Administrative Procedure Act as
"the whole or a part of a final disposition . . . of an agency in a
matter other than rule making."3 1 In New York v. FAA, the Sec-
ond Circuit indicated that while the term "order" is to be liber-
ally construed, "only final orders are reviewable" under the
predecessor to § 46110(a).3 2 A final order, as defined by the Sec-
ond Circuit, is one that "imposes an obligation, denies a right,
or fixes some legal relationship."3 As mentioned above, there
are two criteria that an order must satisfy to constitute a "final
order" that is reviewable by the court: (1) "the agency action
25 Id. at 96-98 (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997)).
26 Id. at 96 (internal quotation marks omitted).
27 Id. (quoting New York v. FAA, 712 F.2d 806, 808 (2d Cir. 1983)).
28 Id.
29 Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a) (2006)).
30 Id. at 96 n.10.
31 Id. at 96 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (2012)).
32 New York v. FAA, 712 F.2d 806, 808 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing McManus v. Civil
Aeronautics Bd., 286 F.2d 414, 417 (2d Cir. 1961)); see 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a)
(amending 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1958)).
New York, 712 F.2d at 808 (quoting Rombough v. FAA, 594 F.2d 893, 895 n.4
(2d Cir. 1979)).
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must mark the 'consummation of the agency's decision making
process'"; and (2) the agency action "must be one by which
rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal
consequences will follow."3 4 The Second Circuit, in addition to
finding that a "letter advising the City to follow safety recom-
mendations, without more, hardly 'fixes a legal relationship,"'
endorsed a D.C. Circuit case from 1979 stating, "The FAA is not
empowered to prohibit or limit proposed construction it deems
dangerous to air navigation."" Here, the court highlighted the
fact that the FAA, in addition to purporting to only "recom-
mend" that the City implement the panel's recommendations,
does not have the legal authority to "impose an obligation" or
"deny a right" to "fix a legal relationship" with the City with re-
gard to the construction of the North Shore Marine Transfer
Station." The Second Circuit, in differentiating the Letter, sim-
ply stated that "the [FAA] Letter here had no such fixed conse-
quences," unlike letters in cases in other circuits that were held
to be reviewable as final agency actions.
The Second Circuit believed that the effect of the Letter was
similar to that of the Letter in Air California v. U.S. Department of
Transportation, where the Ninth Circuit found that the Letter
"from the FAA's chief counsel did not constitute a reviewable
order because it lacked requisites of finality."" In Air California,
"the Orange County Board of Supervisors limited the number of
airline carriers permitted to fly into" Orange County Airport "in
an effort to reduce noise."4 0 The FAA concluded, in response,
that "denying other airlines access to the airport violated FAA-
administered, federal statutes" and further provided "a number
34 See Paskar, 714 F.3d at 96 (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78
(1997)).
35 Id. at 96-97 (quoting Aircraft Owners & Pilots Ass'n v. FAA, 600 F.2d 965,
967 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
6 Id. at 96.
3 Id. at 97. The Second Circuit cites several cases that have held that FAA
letters are reviewable. See San Diego Air Sports Ctr., Inc. v. FAA, 887 F.2d 966, 970
(9th Cir. 1989) (holding that an FAA letter banning parachuting near an airport
was a final order); Air One Helicopters, Inc. v. FAA, 86 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir.
1996) (holding that a letter denying Air One the right to register its helicopter in
the United States was a final order); S. Cal. Aerial Advertisers' Ass'n v. FAA, 881
F.2d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that an FAA letter banning fixed-wing
aircraft travel through a shoreline area was final agency action).
38 654 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1981).
39 Paskar, 714 F.3d at 97.
40 Id.
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of suggestions for reducing noise around the airport."4 1 The
Letter at issue in Air California was written by the FAA's chief
counsel. 2 It suggested that "the FAA might withhold federal
funding" and "threatened to impose penalties," but it was not a
"final order" because "it was neither a definitive statement of the
agency's position nor a document with the status of law.4 3 The
Ninth Circuit also pointed to the fact that the FAA could have
been challenged in subsequent enforcement actions before ulti-
mately concluding that the Letter "did not impose an obliga-
tion, deny a right, or fix some legal relationship."4 4
The holding in Paskar is in line with the restrictive view of
what constitutes a reviewable agency order in the Second Cir-
cuit." The Second Circuit concluded that the Letter was not a
final order because the Letter did not contain a "command."4 6
Rather, it "urged" action and labeled the recommendations it
endorsed as "important."4 ' The Letter did not impose an abso-
lute duty, but the City chose to comply, so there is no clear indi-
cation as to whether the FAA would have brought legal action or
exercised its authority in any manner that would have disrupted
the construction of the North Shore Marine Transfer Station.4 8
Additionally, the Second Circuit was correct in pointing out the
similarity of the case to the Ninth Circuit's holding in Air Califor-
nia, which applied a comparable but more generalized test to
determine whether an order was reviewable."9 Similar to the Let-




4 Id.; Air Cal. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 654 F.2d 616, 621 (9th Cir. 1981).
45 See Paskar, 714 F.3d at 90.
46 See id. at 96.
47 Id.
- See id. The FAA is an agency of the U.S. Department of Transportation with
authority to regulate and oversee all aspects of American civil aviation. Safety: The
Foundation ofEverything We Do, FAA, http://www.faa.gov/about/safety-efficiency/
(last modified Feb. 1, 2013). The Second Circuit, without a supporting citation,
notes that the City could have accepted or rejected the FAA's recommendations
without recourse by any party. See Paskar, 714 F.3d at 96.
4 See Paskar, 714 F.3d at 97. The Ninth Circuit based its decision in Air Califor-
nia on an analysis of whether the letter written by the FAA contained requisites offinality, holding that the letter in question was not a final order because it was
"neither a definitive statement of the agency's position nor a document with the
status of law." Air Cal., 654 F.2d at 620.
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plicit language and a number of suggestions-none of which
were binding."o
However, the test used by the Second Circuit to determine
whether an order is reviewable under 49 U.S.C. § 46110 ignores
the practical implications of letters written by agencies to cit-
ies." The method of analysis used by the Second Circuit allows
the FAA to compel compliance with aviation construction rec-
ommendations in a manner that is not reviewable by the
courts.5 In Paskar, it was a third party that was left without a
remedy at law for the recommendations of the FAA,5" but in
future cases it could be a party directly affected by an FAA rec-
ommendation that wants to seek assurance, by way of court re-
view, that legal action will not be commenced if the
recommendations are rejected. Allowing the FAA to endorse
recommendations in a direct letter with intimidating language
and escape the oversight established by Congress seems to di-
rectly undermine the spirit of 49 U.S.C. § 46110.
A more sensible approach is that taken by the Fifth Circuit as
recently as 2008, in which a "moral suasion" test is applied to
determine whether an order is final and thus reviewable.54 In
Paskar, the Second Circuit acknowledged this approach as an
alternative test but stated that it is "not the test in the Second
Circuit."" The court elaborated, stating that even if it applied
the moral suasion test, it would not be satisfied "because the
FAA Letter did not impose a 'practical stumbling block to the
construction' of the North Shore Station. 5
The Second Circuit's application of the Fifth Circuit's "moral
suasion" test is guided by the "practical stumbling block" analysis
found in Air Line Pilots' Ass'n International v. U.S. Department of
Transportation.5 While the "practical stumbling block" analysis is
50 See Paskar, 714 F.3d at 96-97; Air Cal., 654 F.2d at 618-19.
5 Compare Air Cal., 654 F.2d at 619-21, with Paskar, 714 F.3d at 96-98.
52 The FAA was one of the appointed members of the panel that was assem-
bled to address the problems at LaGuardia Airport. Paskar, 714 F.3d at 94. Thus,
the FAA is endorsing a panel recommendation that it presumably had strong
influence over while avoiding judicial review by refusing to make any kind of
"final order" or other reviewable determination.
53 See id. at 91, 95-96.
54 See id. at 98 (referencing AirLine Pilots'Ass'n Int' v. Dep't of Transp., 446 F.2d
236, 240-41 (5th Cir. 1971), and Menard v. FAA, 548 F.3d 353, 357 (5th Cir.
2008)).
55 Id.
56 Id. at 99.
5 See id. at 98; Air Line Pilots' Ass'n Int'l, 446 F.2d at 240-42.
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sufficient to determine the finality of an order when challenged
by someone planning to carry out construction, the analysis
does not adapt very well to third-party challenges, as in Paskar.
As petitioners Kenneth Paskar and LaGuardia Airport, Inc.
pointed out in their Reply Brief, the Letter had "substantial
practical impacts."5 8 Furthermore, the Second Circuit pointed
to the fact that "[n]o other regulatory agenc[ies were]
await[ing] the issuance of the panel report."" However, the
court failed to mention that the Department of Environmental
Conservation "approved [the] modification of the [City's] per-
mit, with the condition that '[a]ll of the assumptions and recom-
mendations in [the Panel Report were] to be strictly
followed."'o In Air Line Pilots' Ass'n International, the Fifth Cir-
cuit also considered the fact that "the wind [was] taken out of
[any] safety argument" by the order and that it would be diffi-
cult for opponents to "arouse public reaction against the struc-
tures."6 Similarly, City officials, including Mayor Michael
Bloomberg, dismissed safety concerns about the North Shore
Marine Transfer Station by pointing to the fact that it had been
"vetted by the FAA."62 At the very least, the argument that the
Letter had the force of "moral suasion" would have had a higher
chance of succeeding than the argument the petitioners had to
make under the Second Circuit's narrow two-pronged test."
By dismissing the claim in Paskar, the Second Circuit allowed
the FAA to endorse recommendations by panels on which the
FAA has members without being subject to judicial review.6 4 As
shown by the arguments put forth by the petitioners, these let-
ters can have "substantial practical impacts."6" By allowing such
endorsements to escape judicial review, the Second Circuit
opens up the possibility of administrative abuse and leaves third
58 Reply Brief of Petitioners Kenneth Paskar and Friends of LaGuardia Airport,
Inc. at 8, Paskar, 714 F.3d 90 (No. 10-4612), 2011 WL 4350682, at *8 [hereinafter
Reply Brief of Petitioners].
5 Paskar, 714 F.3d at 99.
60 Reply Brief of Petitioners, supra note 58, at 9.
61 Air Line Pilots'Ass'n Int'l, 446 F.2d at 241.
62 Alison Bowen, Next Miracle'May Be Disaster, LGA Critics Say, METRO (Jan. 11,
2011), http://www.metro.us/newyork/lifestyle/2012/01/11/next-miracle-may-
be-disaster-lga-critics-say/.
63 See Paskar, 714 F.3d at 96, 98-99.
6 See id. at 91, 96-99.
65 See Reply Brief of Petitioners, supra note 58, at 9.
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parties without legal recourse even if they qualify as "person [s]
disclosing a substantial interest in an order."6 6
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